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Abstract  recent  milk  over-supply,  but  one  is  partic-
An  interregional  reactive  programming  ularly important.  That  is, the price  support
A  interregional  reactive  programmig  .program  has  maintained  the  milk  price  at model of the  United  States  dairy  industry  is  the  milk  price  at
used to test the welfare  implications  of sev-  parity  related  levels  which  have  exceeded
private sector market  clearing  prices. eral dairy  program changes  on milk produc-  Plicy  setor  t  ea  wit  te  srps
ers,  milk  consumers,  and  taxpayers.  The  the  surplus ers,  milkconsumers '  and  taxpayers.  The  milk problem has been aimed toward reduc- results  showed  that each  of the  tested alter-  mi  proem hs been  ie  toward reduc- ing  production  through  price  or  other  in- natives  (price  support reduction,  price  sup-  centiv.  on  gre  e  imina the or  her  in-
port reduction with frozen minimum  Class I support price adjustment  and has  effectively price,  assessments,  and  production  quotas)  support price aus  t  has effectively
could  reduce  price  frozen the support price at the October 1980
substantially.  However,  assessments reduced  level  or below. This action was not sufficient substantially.  However,  assessments reduced 
expenditures most effectively in terms of cost  to  keep  production  and  price  support  pur- chases from increasing. A per hundredweight to milk producers for the United States  gen-  A per  dredwegt
erally  while  price  support  reduction  with  ae  ent  n all  i  marketed  was  legis-
frozen  minimum  Class  I price  was  most  ef-  ed in 1982. The purpose of the assessment
ficacious  in terms  of cost to  Southeast  pro-  ws  t  reduce  pr  ctin  lowering  pro-
ducers.  ducer  prices  while  providing  rev- ducers.
enue to offset price support  costs. However,
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reactive  programming.  generally  prevented  the  assessments  from
Generally,  dairy  market  regulation  has  having much effect on production  and price Generally,  dairy  market  regulation  has  support  purchases
proven  quite  workable  over  the  nearly  35  During  the fall  of  1983,  a  paid  15-month
years it has existed in its present form. Under  voluntar  diversion program coupled  with a
regulation,  the  industry  has  provided  ade-  reduction  in  the  price  support  level  and  a
quate  quantities  of milk  at  stable  producer  pe  hundredweight  assessment  was  legis-
and consumer prices.  Recently,  the dairy in-  lated. Although production and price support
dustry has produced substantially more milk  outlays were down  in 1984,  both  have been
than has been  consumed at legislatively  sup-  increasing  since  completion  of the paid  di-
ported  market  prices.  This  has  resulted  in  version. Several other policyproposalswhich
large  government  outlays  through  the  dairy  were  discussed  before  passage  of the  1983
price  support  program.  Even  though two  of  legislation are under discussion for the 1985
the  goals  of  the  dairy  program  are  being  Farm  Bill.  Among  these  are  simple  support
satisfied,  i.e.,  adequate  supplies  and  stable  level reductions, reduced support  level with
prices,  these  large  government  outlays  have  fluid  milk  prices  frozen  at  previous  levels,
brought  calls for reform of dairy market reg-  and base  licensing  programs with  restricted
ulation. Many factors have contributed to the  sales.
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'Principle  among  these  other  factors  were  relatively  low prices  for  feed  and  other  agricultural  commodities
which when combined  with price support policies  have made  dairy a relatively attractive  enterprise  as  compared
to alternatives.
181The purpose  of this paper  is  to detail  and  PB 1 is price received by Grade  B milk pro-
empirically  estimate  the  welfare  effects  of  ducers  in region  i,
possible  federal  dairy  program  changes  on  Ao,  B,, Fo,  and  Mo are  constants,
United States milk producers, consumers, and  Al  is  farm  level elasticity  of Grade A milk
taxpayers. Four alternative policy changes are  supply with respect  to Grade A price,
examined:  per unit assessments, simple price  A 2 is farm  level  elasticity of Grade  A milk
support  reductions,  reduced  support  level  supply with respect  to Grade  B  price,
with  frozen  fluid  milk  prices,  and  base  li-  QBi is quantity of Grade  B  milk produced
censing  with restricted  sales.  in region  i,
B 1 is  farm level  elasticity  of Grade  B  milk
supply with respect to Grade  B  price,
THE  CONCEPTUAL  MODEL  B 2 is farm  level elasticity  of Grade  B  milk
supply with respect  to Grade A price,
To accomplish the objective  of this paper,  QIi  is quantity'of Grade  A milk consumed
a single period reactive  programming model  in fluid  products  in region  i,
of the United  States  dairy industry  was con-  Pli is farm  level fluid milk price  in region
structed  (Seale  and  Trammel).  The  model  i,
includes classified pricing, price support pro-  F 1 is  the  farm  level  elasticity  of demand
gram,  and  fluid/manufacturing  milk quality  for fluid milk products  with respect  to
conditions and is capable  of defining market  the price of milk used in fluid products,
equilibrium under the assumptions of various  QMi  is  quantity of milk used in  manufac-
dairy program changes. From the equilibrium  tured products  purchased by consumers
solutions of the model, the welfare effects of  in  region  i,
the  tested  dairy  program  changes  were  cal-  PM  is farm level manufacturing milk price
culated.  Conceptually,  the  model  builds on  in region  i,
the earlier work of Ippolitto and Masson and  M,  is the  farm  level  elasticity  of demand M  hfr  m  level  elasticity  of deman  d
Kessel  and  is  similar  to  one  developed  by  for milk used in manufactured products
Whipple.  with  respect  to the  price  of milk  used
in manufactured  products, Functionally,  the  model is:  in manufactured  products,
QII  is  quantity  of  Grade  A  milk  used  in
(1)  QA,  =  Ao(PA,)A ^ (PB,)A2,  manufactured products in region i  (Class
II  and  Class  III  uses  are  combined  for
(2)  QB1 =  B0(PBi)Bi(PA1)B2,  the purpose  of this study),
(3)  QIi  =  F(PII)Fl,  QATi  is  the  net quantity  of  Grade  A  milk
traded  in region  i  (positive  for region  i
(4)  QM,  =  Mo(PMi)M,,  imports,  negative  for region  i  exports),
(5)  QIII  =QA  +  QAT\  - QIiT  PMMw  is farm  level  Grade  B  milk price  in
()Qll-  QA~  +  QATI  Q  Minnesota and Wisconsin,
(6)  PI,  =  PMMW  +  CLI1,  PIIi  is  farm  level  price  of  Grade  A  milk
(7)  PIIi  =  PMMW,  used in manufactured products in region
(7)  PIIt  =  PMw,  ,
(QIi)(PI,)  +  (QII,)(PII)  ,  CLI, is the differential  paid for Class I  milk
(8)  +  QAT  in region  i,
SL is the USDA price support level for man-
(9)  PB,  =  PMi,  ufacturing  milk,
(1  0)  PM 1;  2-  SL~,  QMTi is quantity of milk used  in manufac-
(10)  PM, >L SL,  tured  products  in region  i,
(11)  QMT,  =  QII,  +  QBi  +  QBTi,  QBT, is net quantity of Grade B milk traded
in region i (positive for region i imports,
(12)  QMS,  =  QMT,  - QMi,  and  negative for region  i  exports),  and
(13)  QI,  <  QA  +  QAT,,  QMS,  is quantity of milk used  in manufac-
Q 1 ')  QA  +  QAT1,i  itured  products in region i, purchased by
where:  the government  sector.
QAi  is quantity of Grade A  milk produced  Equations  (1)  and  (2)  are  respective  sup-
in region  i,  ply functions  for Grade  A and  B  milk.  Equa-
PA 1 is blend price received by Grade A milk  tions  (3)  and  (4)  are  demand functions  for
producers  in region  i,  fluid and manufacturing milk. The remaining
182eight equations  describe  the  allocation  and  ply must meet demand intraregionally (equa-
pricing  provisions  of the  market  orders  and  tion (14))  and for all regions (equation (15)),
price  support restrictions.  Equations  (9)  is  and  interregional  price  differences  cannot
a  competitive  pricing  identity  for  manufac-  exceed  transportation  costs.
turing  milk.  Equations  (6),  (7),  and  (8)  are
pricing  identities  associated  with  classified
pricing. Equation (13)  restricts Class I (fluid)  Empirical  Model  Specification
use  milk  to  Grade  A  quality.  Equation  (5),
the  Class  II  allocation  identity,  shows  the  Computational difficulty required the sum-
residual  nature  of  manufacturing  uses  of  mation  of the  Grade  A and  Grade  B  supply
Grade  A milk.  Class  II  and Class  III  market  functions for an all milk supply schedule  of
order uses  are  combined  and  denoted  Class  the  form:
II (QII,)  for the purposes of this study. Equa-  (19)  QS  =  S0(PS)1
tion (10)  defines  the price  floor established
by the price support program. Equation  (11)  where:
is  the  manufacturing  milk  supply  identity  QSi  is  the  quantity  of  milk  supplied  in
while equation  (12)  defines  the  quantity of  region  i,
price support purchases.  PSi is the average price paid milk producers
Market equilibrium in region i occurs when:  in region  i,
So  is  a  constant,  and
(14)  QA,  +  QB,  +  QAT,  +  QBT,  =  QIi  S,  is  the  elasticity  of  milk  supply  with
+  QMi  +  QMS,  respect  to price.
The  use  of  an  all  milk  supply  schedule subject to the previously  defined  conditions  rather  than  Grade  and  Grade  B  schedule (equations  (1. 13)).  rather than  Grade A  and  Grade  B  schedules
e(equations  (1-13))e  u  oe  i  . T  requires the model assumption that the price
nterreon  eu  ru  oer N suh  paid for Grade  B  milk equals the price  paid kets  (N> 1)  occurs  when:  for Grade A milk used in manufactured prod-
N  N  ucts.  Further,  the  estimated  producer  price
(15)  (QA,  +  QBI)  =  Z  (QI,  is  the  average  milk  price  rather  than  the
i=  i  Grade A blend price.  The use of the all milk
supply schedule  does not seriously limit the
+  QMi +  QMSi)  usefulness  of the empirical  model if the re-
subject  to the conditions  that:  suts are properly interpreted for regions with
Grade  B milk production.  Further, very little
(16)  I  PA  - PA, I <  TFi,  Grade  B  milk is produced outside the Upper
Midwest;  thus, this limitation does not affect
(17)  IPM,  - PM- I < TMij,  and  most supply  areas of the  model.
(18)  I PIi  PI  I <  TI IJThe  continental  United States was  divided
18J)  il  ￿T 1 ,into  21 regions,  each with separate functions
where:  defining  their fluid  and  manufacturing  milk
TFi  is the transportation cost for bulk fluid  demands,  as  well  as  milk  supply  relation-
milk between  region  i  and region  j,  ships.  Demand  and  supply  schedules  were
TMi  is  the  transportation  cost  for  manu-  constructed for each region using  1981 State
factured  milk  products  between  region  and Federal Market Order price and quantity
i  and  region j,  and  data  (USDA,  1981  a,b,c,d)  and  elasticity es-
TI,  is the transportation  cost for packaged  timates.2 The  1981  data  were used because
fluid milk products between region i and  they  were  the  most  recent  available  when
region  j.  the research  was conducted.  Although  these
These equilibrium conditions (equations  (14-  data  are  somewhat  dated,  their  use  should
18))  are  met in  the  interregional  model by  not  seriously  limit the  usefulness  of results
the  equilibrium  seeking  technique  of  the  since many of the economic and policy forces
reactive programming algorithm. That is, sup-  at work in the past several years were at work
.
2Supply  schedules were  based on  marketings for  each  region and  average  milk  prices  in  each region.  Demand
schedules  were based  on  market  order  utilization  and prices  in  each  region.  In  areas  not covered  by  a market
order,  demand  schedules were  based  on per  capital  consumption  in  surrounding  market  orders.  It was  assumed
that within  each region,  all  milk not used  in fluid  products  was  used in manufactured  products.
183in  1981.  Further,  conditions  in  1981  may  equilibrium.  Even so, as with any simulation
better represent  a status quo policy situation  model,  even  perfect model  validation  using
since  producers  were  not  adjusting  to  as-  historical data does not ensure accurate model
sessments  and the  diversion  program.  How-  results for different  environments.
ever,  some  type  of  congressional  action  in
dealing with mounting government removals
seemed imminent.  Demand elasticity param-  Policy  Alternatives
eters  were  set  based  on  estimates  by  Dahl-
gran. The elasticities of demand for fluid milk  Four  potential  policy  alternatives  are  ex-
(F1)  and manufacturing  milk  (M,)  were  set  amined  in  this  paper:  (1)  a  per  hundred-
at -0.112  and  -0.352,  respectively, for all  weight assessment on all milk produced;  (2)
regions.  a  decrease  in the price support  level;  (3)  a
The supply elasticities were set by the au-  decrease  in  the  price  support  level  while
thors based  on a  review of several  elasticity  raising  Class I differentials  by the amount of
estimates  (Dahlgran;  George  and King; Bran-  the decrease  to hold minimum Class  I prices
dow;  Chen  et al.). No  particular  study's  es-  at current levels;  and (4)  a quota restricting
timates were used, rather the parameter values  each  producer  to  a portion  of his  base  pro-
were selected  from within  the range  of the  duction  (usually  the  preceding  year  or  an
available  estimates  so  as to  model the  dairy  average  of  some  years'  production)  while
industry's  longterm  and  shortterm  response  limiting  entry  of  new producers  to  control
to  various  program  changes.  In  estimating  the  quantity of milk  produced.  Adjustments
longterm  adjustments,  a  supply elasticity  of  to the dairy industry model necessary to sim-
.50  was  used.  In  the  authors'  opinion,  this  ulate  equilibrium  under alternative  policies
parameter  reflected  the  price/quantity  re-  and definition  of the welfare  effects  of alter-
sponsiveness  of  milk supply over  a  2-  to  4-  native  policies  are detailed  in the following
year  adjustment period;  a period  thought to  discussion.
be  the  maximum  time  allowed  a  particular  Assessment
program  to  meet  policy  objectives  before
alternatives  would  be  sought.  An  elasticity  With  a  per hundredweight  assessment  on
of  0.25  was  used  to  reflect  a  shorter  term  all  milk marketed,  producers  receive  PSi-T
response  (1  to  2  years).  Calculated  demand  for milk rather than PS, where T is the amount
and supply schedules were of the form shown  of the  assessment.  The  supply  function  for
in equations  (3)  and  (4)  and  (19),  respec-  milk is then:
tively.  Variation in elasticities among regions  20  S  PS
was  not considered  since  Dahlgran  showed  )  i  i  )
such differences  to be insignificant.  Transfer  The  post-assessment  supply  function  is
costs between  regions were  estimated based  shifted  along  the  price  axis  relative  to  the
on  supply  to  demand  point  distances  and  pre-assessment  supply by the amount  of the
transportation  cost  functions  estimated  by  assessment. With the assessment, the average
Lough and Hallberg et al. Transfer costs were  milk price would fall  and production would
adjusted to the  1981  price level by the con-  decline.  As  long  as  production  did  not de-
sumer price index for transportation service.  dine enough  so as to avoid  support activity
To validate  the model, the variable param-  and force prices to rise, the assessment would
eters  were  set  to  simulate  observed  1981  have no effect  on consumer prices,  and pro-
market  equilibrium.  These  estimates  were  ducer  price would  decline  but by less  than
compared with the actual  price and quantity  the assessment  since  the percentage  of milk
data. The base empirical model misestimated  used in Class I would increase. Reduced prices
producer prices and quantities by 2.3 percent  and  quantities  indicate  a  loss  of producers'
and  1.7  percent,  respectively.  Fluid  milk  surplus. Producers'  surplus  loss  (PSLi)  is the
prices  and  quantities  were  misestimated  by  area above the supply schedule, between the
1.0  percent  and  0.4  percent,  respectively,  pre- and post-assessment  equilibrium prices.
while  manufacturing  milk  prices  and quan-  Mathematically:
tities were  misestimated  by 1.4  percent and  PSia  Si
0.5  percent.3 These  results  suggest  the  em-  (21)  PSL,  =  SO(PSi)  d  PS.
pirical model satisfactorily  simulates market  PSi(c
3The  model  was  also  validated  using  1976,  1978,  and  1980  data  with  similar  result.  Further,  a  sensitivity
evaluation  showed  the  model  to  be  relatively  insensitive  to  moderate  (+  50  percent)  change  in  the  demand
elasticity parameters.
184The  "a"  indicates  the  pre-assessment  value  Lowered  support level  with  frozen
for the particular variable and "o"  indicates  minimum  Class  I prices
the  post-assessment  value  for the  particular
variable.  Total  assessment  revenue  (TR)  is:  policy  calls  for  a  reduction  in  the
support level  to SL"  as  in the previous  case,
(22)  TR  =  (QSi)  (T).  while  the  Class  I  differential  (CLI)  is  in-
The  assessment  induced  production  de-  reased  by the amount  of the support  level reduction to  CLIO. The demand for manufac- dine results  in a reduction  in price support  . Te demad fr  manac
expenditures.  Price  support  savings  (PSSj)  turing  milk is  perfectly  elastic  at  SL"  while
are:  o  /the  Class  I  price is:
(27)  PIT=  PMOw  +  CLIa  +ASL (23)  PSS,  =  (QMS?-  QMS")  (PM?+  PTSA),  ()  P  =  +  C 
=  PMOw  +  CLIi, where  PTSA  is  the cost of processing,  trans-  P  +  CLI,
portation,  storage,  and  administration  per  where ASL is the change in the price support
hundredweight  of milk purchased  for price  level  (ASL  =  SL  - SL). As  in the previous
support.  two  cases,  lowered  prices  and  quantities
Lowered  price support  would reduce  producers'  surplus  as defined
by equation  (21). Lower manufacturing milk
A  reduction  in the price  support level  re-  prices  would  increase  consumption  with  a
duces the floor under the manufacturing milk  resulting  rise  in  manufacturing  milk  con-
price.  The  demand  for  manufacturing  milk  sumers'  surplus  (defined by equation  (25)).
(equation (4)) is then perfectly elastic at SL"  Finally,  reduced  manufacturing  milk  price,
rather  than  SLa  (equation  (10))  where  "a"  increased  private  sector  consumption,  and
indicates  the  initial  support  level  and  "o"  lower  overall  milk  production  reduces  the
indicates the reduced  support  level. Assum-  expenditures required for price support  (de-
ing substantial price support activities in the  fined  by  equation  (26)).  Since  fluid  milk
market,  a lower support level would lead  to  prices would be unaffected,  fluid consumers'
lower  milk  prices,  with  increased  private  surplus would be unaffected  by this program
sector consumption,  decreased  milk produc-  change.
tion,  and  decreased  price  support expendi-  Since  Class  I  prices are  frozen,  this  effect
tures. As  in the case  of the assessment,  lower  on milk producers in different markets would
prices  and quantities would reduce  produc-  vary.  If the percentage  of Class I  use in the
ers'  surplus.  This loss of producers'  surplus  market was  near  100,  the effect  of the  low-
is  defined  by equation  (21).  Reduced  fluid  ered  support  would  be  small.  If  the  per-
and manufacturing milk product prices would  centage  used in Class  I was  low,  most of the
increase  milk consumption  and  consumers'  price  effects  of the  lowered  support  level
surplus.  Fluid  milk  consumer  surplus  gain  would be transmitted to the producer through
·(FCSG)  is  defined  by:  a lower blend price. Producer prices for Grade
B  milk would  decrease  by the reduction  in
(24)  FCSG 1 =  F(PI)a Fd  the  support level. (24)  FCSG,  =  J  Fo(PI,)  d PI,
PIco  Production quota
Similarly,  manufacturing  milk  consumers'  A production quota would limit  each pro-
surplus  gain  (MCSG)  is defined  by:  ducer  to  a  portion  of  the  firm's  previous
PMjCa  M  annual production. The milk supply function
(25)  MCSG,  =  Mo(PM,)  d  PM1. would  become:
PMo  (28)  QS,  =  S0(PSi) S for  QS, <  QSQI,
Lowered  manufacturing  milk prices  with  otherwise:
increased  consumption  and  decreased  pro-
duction  would reduce  the  expenditures  re-  QS  =  QSQi,
quired for price support. The saving in price  where  QSQ,  is  the  total  market  production
support  expenditure  (PSS)  is:  quota for region  i.
(26)  PSS,  =  [(PM?  +  PTSA)  (QMS)]  The  supply function is  perfectly  inelastic
at the quota  quantity.  Assuming QS,  exceeds
- [(PM?  +  PTSA)  (QMS)].  QSQ,  at  the  market  price,  the  quota results
185in  loss of producers'  surplus,  gain of quota  weight  assessment  with  T  set  at  $.50  and
rent, and lower price support expenditures.  $1.00,  (2)  price  support  level  reductions
Producers'  surplus loss is defined by equation  with  ASL  set at  $1.00  and  $2.00,  (3)  price
(29)  as:  support level reductions with ASL set at $1.00
and $  2.00 and minimum Class I prices frozen,
(29)  PSLT  =  J  S. (PS)  d PS,  and  (4)  production  quotas with  QSQ,  set  at
(9PS  PSQi  °  '  )  a95  percent and 90 percent  of 1981  produc-
tion.  The effects  of these  potential  policies
where:  on milk  producers  and consumers  and gov-
(  PS-i  emernment  expenditures  as  previously defined
(30)  PSQ,  =  (QSQ,/So)si.  were estimated for each of the model regions.
PSQi is the supply price at the quota quantity
(QSQ,)  and thus is the marginal  cost of pro-
ducing milk in region  i under  the quota.  It  RESULTS
should be noted that this is marginal cost for
the  industry  within  the  region  rather  than  Estimates  of  the  welfare  implications  of
marginal  cost for  an  individual  firm.  If the  the aforementioned  policies are  listed in Ta-
price  received  by  producers  exceeds  this  ble 1. A summary of price support purchase,
marginal  cost,  the economic rent accrues  to  government  outlays,  and  welfare  effects  as-
the owner of the quota.  This rent is  defined  sociated with each  policy are  listed in Table
by:  2. Complete  regional  results  are  not shown
in  the  interest  of brevity,  but  regional  im-
(31)  QRi  =  QSQ,(PS,  - PSQ,),  plications of particular interest are discussed
where  QR is the rent to the quota  in region  in the text. Other regional detail  is available
i.  from  the  authors.  Further,  in  the  following
Initially, the  milk producer would be the  discussion, only the long-term results are dis-
quota  owner,  but  if ownership  were  trans-  cussed  except  where  contrast  between  the
ferable or if quota  could be leased,  the eco-  short-  and long-term  is particularly  interest-
nomic rent might  accrue  to other than  milk  ing.
producers. These economic rent formulas are
based on  an assumption  of a perfect  market
for quota. Quota reduced  production would  Assessments
result in lowered price support expenditures
as  defined by  equation  (23).  Consumers'  The  simulation results indicate that a  $.50
asurplus would be unaffected by w  th  ror  redued  prce  support  acquisitions  by  18
change  as  long  as  the  quotas  were  not  so  reduced  price  support  acquisitions  by  18
limiting  as  to  avoid  price  support  activity  percent  (10,511  million pounds down from
forcing  class prices to  rise.  1981  purchases  of 12,861  million pounds).
Reduced  purchases  along  with  assessment
revenue  would have  reduced  price  support
cost by  $1,032.5  million,  a  48  percent  re-
pecification  of Policy  Alternates  uction from 1981  expenditures of $2,134.0
The various  model parameters were  set to  million,  Table  2.5 Producers'  surplus  would
reflect alternative  dairy market  policy aimed  have  fallen  to  $643.3  million,  3  percent  of
toward  reducing  government  expenditures  producers' revenue, Table 1. The unweighted
on dairy price support.  Specific policy alter-  sum  of welfare  effects  which  would  have
natives  modeled  were:  (1)  per  hundred-  resulted from a $.50 assessment totals $389.2
4The  longer run  implications of quota  transfer are  not considered in this  analysis.  For example,  sale  or lease of
a large  portion  of a region's quota  to  lower  cost  producers  outside  the  region could  lead to  higher  consumer
prices due  to increased  transportation costs.  It could  also  lead to lower  consumer prices  if over-order  premiums
were present.
'The  cost of price support  includes  purchase,  storage,  transport,  and processing  costs.  Revenue  from the  sale
of stocks is not included. The  resource misallocation and reallocation which results from dairy market intervention,
both price support  and market order,  are not addressed  in this  paper. For such analyses,  see  Dahlgran and Buxton
and Hammond.  The  cost of price  support under  alternative policies was  estimated by multiplying  the number  of
pounds purchased times  the actual  cost of the  price support per pound purchased  in  1981  plus or minus the per
pound  effect  of the  various  policy options  on  the support  level  (i.e.,  $2,134.0  million/12,8
61  million  pounds
± support level  adjustment  factor).  For example,  a support  level reduction  of $1.00  from the  1981  level  would
reduce  price support outlays  by  $0.01  per pound  purchased.
186TABLE  1.  TOTAL  EFFECTS  OF  THE  SELECTED  PROGRAM  CHANGES  ON  PRODUCERS'  AND  CONSUMERS'  SURPLUS  IN  THE  U.  S.
DAIRY  SECTOR,  1981
Long-term  effects  (S,  =  0.50)  Short-term  run  (S,  =  0.25)
Policy  option  FCSGa  MCSGa  PSLa  QRb  FCSGa  MCSGa  PSLa
--------------------.-------------------....  - millions  of  dollars-  .......................................
No action  ............. 
$.50  assessment  ...................... 643.3  643.3  61
[3.0%]  [3.4%] $1.00  assessment  ....................  1,284 .2  - - 1,219.9
[7.1%]  [6.7%] Lower  support level  $1.00  ......  535.1  607.8  1,225.5  535.5  638.9  1,283.4
[6.7%]  [7.1%]  [6.7%]  [6.7%]  [7.5%]  [7.1%] Lower support  level  $2.00  ......  940.3  1,095.8  2,094.1  1,085.6  1,299.8  2,453.1
[11.8%]  [12.8%]  [11.5%]  [13.6%]  15.2%]  [13.5%] Lower support  level  $1.00,  .....  748.4  722.4  -45.5  737.4
freeze  Class  I price  [7.3%]  [3.9%]  [7.6%]  [4.1%] Lower support level  $2.00,  .....  1,493.3  1,475.5  - 1,319.7  1,481.1 freeze  Class I  price  [14.7%]  [8.1%]  [15.5%]  [8.1%] 95 percent  productionc  quotad  - 1,623.6  1,657.9 
[8.9%]  [9.1%] 90 percent  productionc  quotad  3,160.4  3,066.7 
[17.4%]  [16.8%]
aFCSG=fluid milk consumers' surplus gain; MCSG=manufactured  product consumers'  surplus gain; PSL=producers' surplus  loss.  The  numbers in  brackets  represent the  gain  (loss)  in consumers'  (producers')  surplus as  a percent of consumer  (producer)  expenditure  (revenue).
bQR-quota  rent.  The numbers  in brackets  represent the  quota  rent as  a percent  of producers'  revenue.
-Since  production  is  at the  limit  of the  quota,  the  producer operates  on the  perfectly inelastice  portion of his supply schedule.  Thus,  the elasticity  on the  more  elastic portion  does  not affect equilibrium.
dConsumer prices were  unaffected by these  program  changes;  thus,  FCSG and MCSG  equal  zero.
million. A  $1.00  assessment would have  re-  Price Support Reduction
duced  support  acquisitions  by  37  percent.
Price support expenditures would have fallen  The  simulation  solutions  indicate  that  a
to  $72.2  million, a  savings of $2,061.8 mil-  100 reduction  in the support  level would
lion, and producers' surplus would have fallen  have reduced price support purchases  by 56
by  7.1  percent  of producers'  revenue.  The  percent  (5,707  million  pounds  down from
sum of the welfare impacts is $777.6 million.  1981  purchases  of  12,861  million  pounds,
As expected,  surplus  loss  as a percentage  of  Table  2).  Similarly,  price  support  expendi-
revenue varies little across regions  since the  ture  would  have  totaled  $889.8  million,  a
tax is applied to each hundredweight of milk  $1,244.2  million savings over  1981  expend-
marketed.  itures  of  $2,134.0  million  (USDA,  1982).
TABLE  2.  EFFECTS  OF  SELECTED  PROGRAM  CHANGES  ON  PRICE  SUPPORT  ACQUISITIONS  AND  EXPENDITURES  AND  THE  SUM  OF
WELFARE  EFFECTS,  U. S.  DAIRY  SECTOR,  1981
Price support  Net price support  Assessment  Sum  of measured
acquisitions  expenditure  savingsa  revenue  societal  effects
b
Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short Policy option  term  term  term  term  term  term  term  term
---million  pounds-  --------------.----.--------. millions  of dollars  ................................
No action  .......................  12,861.0  12,861.0  0.0  0.0  0  0 $0.50 assessment  ....................  10,511.0  11,981.0  1,032.5  789.7  647.8  654.4  389.2  175.4 $1.00 assessment  ..................  8,061.0  10,560.0  2,061.8  1,709.7  1,270.1  1,295.1  777.6  489.8 Lower support level  $1.00  .....  5,707.0  8.049.0  1,244.2  879.0  1,161.6  770.0 Lower support level  $2.00  .....  0.0  2,904.0  2,134.0  1,710.2  - 2,076.0  1,642.5 Lower support  level  $1.00,
freeze  CLI price  ..................  7,200.0  9,124.0  1,011.4  711.4  1,037.4  621.5 Lower support level  $2.00,
freeze  CLI price  ..................  2,361.0  5,639.0  1,789.5  1,311.2  1,807.3  1,149.8 95 percent  production quota  6,608.0  1,032.9  1,067.2
90  percent  production quota  0.0  2,134.0  - 2,040.3
Expenditure  savings  is defined  as the savings  on the cost  of purchasing,  transport,  storage,  and processing plus assessment revenue,  if any.  Price  support expenditures  in  1981  totaled  $2,134.0  million.
bConsumers'  surplus  gains  plus quota  rent,  if any,  minus  producers'  surplus  losses  and plus  savings  on  price support expenditures.
187Fluid  and  manufactured  product  consumers  reflect the  effect  of a  support  level  change.
would  have  netted  surplus  gains  of  $535.1  However,  in regions with little Class II or III
million and $607.8 million, respectively,  Ta-  utilization, Class  I prices may not adjust with
ble  1.  The  support  level  reduction  would  support  level  changes  since  an  added  pre-
have  lowered  producers'  surplus  $1,225.5  mium  may be necessary  to meet Class  I  de-
million  (6.7 percent of producers'  surplus).  mand in the market.  If this was the case  (the
The  simple  sum  of  gains  and  losses  was  Class  I price  does not follow the  M-W price
$1,161.6  million.  Since  consumers'  gains  in each region), this model may overestimate
nearly  offset  producers'  losses,  the  simple  FCSG  and  PSL.
net  effect  of the  policy  was  approximately
equal  to the savings  in support  outlays.
A  $1.74  reduction  in  the  support  level  Price  Support Reduction  With
would  have  eliminated  the  need  for  price  Frozen Class  I Price
support purchases  in the  long run, reducing
support  outlays  to  zero,  Table  2.  Such  a  re-  A  $1.00  reduction  in  the  support  price
duction would have increased fluid and man-  coupled with frozen minimum Class I prices
ufactured  products  consumers'  surplus  by  would  have  reduced  annual  price  support
amounts  equal  to about  12  percent  of  con-  acquisitions  to  7,200  million  pounds  and
sumer  expenditures.  Producers  would  have  expenditures to $1,222.6 million, respective
suffered a surplus  loss equaling 11.5 percent  reductions  of 44 and 47  percent from  1981
of producers'  revenue.  Again,  the simple net  levels,  Table  2.  Manufactured  milk  product
effect  of the  policy was  about  equal  to  the  consumers'  surplus would have increased by
savings  in  support  outlays.  In  the  interme-  $748.4  million which  accounts  for about  7
diate  run, a  $2.00  reduction  in the  support  percent of consumer  expenditures,  Table  1.
level would have reduced support purchases  Milk  producers'  surplus  would  have  been
to  2,904  million pounds rather  than zero  as  reduced  $722.4  (about  4  percent  of  pro-
in  the  longrun  case,  Table  2.  This was  ex-  ducer's  revenue).  The  unweighted  sum  of
pected since  the supply response  associated  the  welfare  effects  totals  $1,037.4  million,
with the intermediate run simulation is more  slightly  less than the  government price sup-
inelastic.  port  expenditures.  The  producers'  surplus
The  simulation  results  indicate  little  dif-  loss  varied  widely by  region.  Losses  in  the
ference  in  the  impact  of the  price  support  Southeast  totaled  1.7  percent  of  producer
reduction  across  regions.  This follows  from  revenue while losses in the Lake States totaled
the assumption that Class I prices adjust with  52 percent  of producer revenue.
the Minnesota-Wisconsin(M-W)  price and thus  A $ 2.00 reduction in the support level with
with  the support  level.  This  assumption  ig-  frozen  Class  I  prices  would  have  reduced
nores the effects of over-order premiums and  price  support  acquisitions  by 82  percent to
the abilities of producers  in some regions  to  2361  millon  pounds  The  welfare  impli-
command these premiums.6 If over-order pre- command these  apremiumsts ofer-order pr  cations for producers  and consumers  follow
miums reflect  the added  costs of produ  s  t  associngated  with  a
milk in  some  regions  as well  as theost of  $1.00  support  level  reduction  coupled  fro-
moving  milk  into  those  regions,  if  deficit,en Class  I prices,  but the effects  are  larger
and added handler costs in some orders (Babb  zen  Class  I  prices,  but the effects  are  larger and added handler costs in some orders (Babb
and Bessler), then a reduction in the support  in magnitude.
price  may  not reduce  the  Class  I price  but  The welfare implications of this alternative
merely  raise  the  over-order  premium  re-  vary widely across regions depending on each
ceived  by  the  producer.  Over-order  premi-  region's Class I utilization.  Regions with high
ums were not considered inthisstudybecause  Class  I  use  would  be  relatively  unaffected
adequate  data  on  over-order  Class  I  prices  while  regions with low Class  I use are most
were not available.  In regions with high Class  affected.  For  markets  with  high  Class  I  uti-
II  or III  utilization,  Class  I prices would be  lization  and/or  over-order  premiums,  the
expected to change  consistent with the sup-  model  may underestimate  the  effect  of this
port  level  and  estimates  should  accurately  program change  on PSL  and FCSG  since it is
6In  many cases,  the Class  I price actually paid the  producer  is  above  the  federal  order Class  I minimum  price.
The difference  between  the federal  order minimum  Class I price and the actual Class I price  is defined as  an over-
order  premium.
188possible  that  over-order  premiums  in  high  become  a  salable  asset  (its worth  would be
Class I utilization markets would be reduced  the  value  of the  quota  discounted  for  time
somewhat since lower blend prices in regions  and risk)  and  its  rent would  be lost  to the
with low Class I use would make transporting  purchasing  producer.
milk to high Class I utilization markets more
attractive.
CONCLUSIONS
Production Quotas  Since the utility functions  of milk produc-
ers  and  consumers  and  taxpayers  are  un-
A  95  percent  production  quota  (setting  known,  no  "best"  policy alternative  can  be
regional  quotas  at  95  percent  of 1981  pro-  selected.  Even  so,  some  interesting  impli-
duction)  would  have reduced  price support  cations  can  be  derived  from  these  results.
acquisitions  to 6,608  million pounds,  a  49  From  the producers'  perspective,  the status
percent reduction.  Expenditures would have  quo  is  probably  the  most  appealing  alter-
fallen  by  $1,032.9  million,  Table  2.  With  a  native  since  all  the  other  alternatives  have
90  percent  production  quota,  there  would  producers'  surplus  losses.  The  90  percent
have been no need for price support activity,  production  quota  may  be  either  the  most
Since  the  supply  function  is  perfectly  in-  appealing  or  least  appealing  of the  alterna-
elastic  at  the  quota  quantity,  the  interme-  tives depending  on the distribution  of quota
diate-run and long-run equilibria do not dif-  rents. It is improbable that quota rents would
fer.  Thus,  only the longrun  implications  are  accrue to the milk producer in the long term,
reported. Over all regions,  a 95 percent quota  since the producer initially assigned the quota
would  have  reduced  producers'  surplus  by  would  likely  capture  the  capitalized  quota
$1,623.6  million  (8.9  percent  of revenue),  rents as revenue from sales of the quota. Thus,
while yielding rent or quota profit of $1,657.9  it would  appear  that  quotas  would  be  at-
million  (9.1  percent  of revenue)  for  a  net  tractive to those  initially receiving  them but
gain to producers of $34.4 million (assuming  unattractive to those potential new producers
the milk producer captures the rent from the  who would  have to buy them.
quota), Table  1.  Quota rent may exceed pro-  If the producer  were to adopt the premise
ducers'  surplus loss without  implying higher  that  price  support  outlays  must  be reduced ducers'  surplus loss without implying higher in order to sustain the political acceptability consumer  prices  since  reduced  production  of the  regulatory system,  then based  on the
results in  a  higher portion  of milk priced at  of tregulorysyst  t  be
the-Class  I  price  The  unweighted  sum  of  ratio  of producers'  surplus  to price  support
outlay savings, the assessments would be most welfare  effects  of  a  95  percent  quota  is  appealing  overall.  A  $50  assessment  costs
$1,067.2  million.  With a  90  percent  quota,  prucers $.53 of producers' surplusforeach
producers would have lost  $3,160.4 million  $1.00  of outlay  savings  comared  to about
producers'  surplus,  but rent to quota would  $1.00 for price suppor  reductionsand $150 $1.00 for price support reductions and  $1.50 have  totaled  $3,066.7  million.  The  un-  for  quotas  (assuming  quota  rent  does  not
weighted  sum  of the welfare  effects  totaled  accrue  to the producer).  The reduced  price
$2,040.3  million.  accrue  to the producer).  The  reduced  price $2,040.3  million.  support  level  with frozen  minimum  Class  I
Regionally, the rent attributed to quota was  price is the most attractive alternative  in the
about  the  same  as  the  loss  of  producers'  Southeast  ($.03  loss  of Southeast producers'
surplus  in  each  region.  Thus,  producer  net  surplus to  $1.00 reduction  in price  support
gain  or  loss  attributed  to  the  quota  would  outlays  compared  to  $.06  for  assessments)
have  been  small  both  over  all  regions  and  and  the  least  attractive  in  the  Lake  States
within  each  region.  This  assumes  the  pro-  ($.28  loss of  Lake  States  producers'  surplus
ducer owns the quota and is able  to capture  per $1.00 outlay reduction compared to $.18
the  revenue  generated  by the quota  as  rent.  loss  for  assessments).  This  result  is  due  to
Initially,  the economic  rent from  the  quota  differing  Class  I  utilizations  in  the  two  re-
would probably accrue to the producer since  gions.
quota would likely be assigned the producer  If a  policy  of lower  price  support  were
based on some historical  production pattern.  adopted,  it is probable  that  in regions with
For  the  quota  system  to  work  in  the  long  relatively high Class  I  utilizations and  over-
term, it seems probable that some mechanism  order  premiums,  the  actual  welfare  impli-
for transfer  of the quota  between producers  cation  would  be  near  the  result  associated
would be  necessary.  If so,  the  quota would  with lowered price support and a frozen min-
189imum Class I price. As previously mentioned,  $1.00  assessment would  come  close.  If tax-
this is due  to the simulation  model  assump-  payer and consumer interests were combined
tion  in the  case  of  a  simple  support  level,  (a logical combination  since most taxpayers
which  is  probably  inaccurate  for  some  re-  are  consumers  and vice versa),  the  most at-
gions.  Thus,  some producers  may support  a  tractive alternative would be a $2.00 support
simple price support level reduction because  level reduction since it results in a large gain
the  welfare  implication  for  their  region  is  of consumers'  surplus and elimination of sup-
similar to  that of a  price  support  reduction  port outlays. If taxpayer and producer inter-
with frozen Class  I  price.  ests  were  summed,  the  $1.00  assessment
Consumers would probably support a sim-  would be the alternative with the lowest cost
ple  price support level  reduction  due  to its  (with  exception  of the  95  percent  and  90
yield  of consumers'  surplus.  Although  the  percent quotas when producer capture of the
consumers'  surplus  gain  may  be  less  than  quota rent is assumed; however, quotas would
estimated in some regions (due to the model  likely  lead to higher  milk  production  costs
assumptions  on  Class  I  pricing),  the  gain  and more  difficult  entry into dairying in the
associated with a lowered support level with  long  term).  This  combination  of  producer
a frozen  minimum  Class  I  price  is  a  lower  and taxpayer  interests  may approximate  the
limit for the increase  in consumers'  surplus.  current political climate where large  outlays
Thus,  a  $2.00  support  level  reduction  is  have  caught  the  taxpayer's  eye  and  have
probably the  most appealing  to consumers.  brought  demands  for  reductions  and  pro-
Taxpayers would best be served by a policy  ducers' interest groups are lobbying Congress
which  eliminated  price  support  outlays.  for favorable treatment. The recently enacted
Either  a  $2.00  price  support  decrease  or  a  assessment provisions are consistent with this
90  percent  quota would achieve  this,  and a  explanation  of the results.
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